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What are the prospects for a linguistic approach to ontology? Given that it seems that there are 
true subject-predicate sentences containing empty names, traditional linguistic approaches to 
ontology appear to be flawed. I argue that in order to determine what there is we need to 
determine which sentences ascribe properties (and relations) to objects, and that there does not 
appear to be any formal criterion for this. This view is then committed to giving an account of 
what predicates do in sentences when they do not ascribe properties. I sketch an approach to 
the varieties of predication. 
 
I. 
Introduction. Following Quine (1948), and more recently Hofweber (2016), I take the central 
ontological question to be what is there? in a sense to be precisified in §3. This contrasts with 
some recent approaches to ontology that take the central ontological question to be what is 
fundamental? It is, of course, interesting to explore relations of dependence between different 
sorts of entity, but this endeavour, is an investigation of relations within our ontology, and in 
order to fully explore these relations we need to determine what our ontology consists of, 
namely what there is. In any case, there is room for both projects. What I aim to do in this paper 
is explore the linguistic approach to (meta)ontology which says that we determine what there 
is by appeal to natural languages. 
 
I will argue that in order to determine what there is we need to determine which sentences 
ascribe properties (and relations) to objects, and that there does not appear to be any formal 
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criterion for this. In §§2-3, I outline two linguistic approaches to ontology due to Frege and 
Hofweber, respectively. I reject such approaches (§4) for the familiar reason that empty names 
can figure in true sentences. Still there is a kernel of truth in both approaches. The truth that 
these approaches encapsulate is often thought to be the claim that true subject-predicate 
sentences are ontologically committing. This thought is appealing, but it is ultimately 
untenable. Rather, it is true property ascriptions that are ontologically committing. In §§4-5, I 
pull apart these two claims, defending the latter and rejecting the former. The view I advocate 
faces two related challenges: what are predicates doing in true subject-predicate sentences that 
contain empty names, if not ascribing properties? and what accounts for the semantic profile 
of empty names in the absence of a referent. §5 makes a start on answering these questions. §6 
briefly mirrors the previous debates concerning first-order ontology in the second-order case.  
 
This paper is wide-ranging and rests on controversial claims at many points, claims that cannot 
be defended in detail in the space available. I make no apology for this. No one paper could 
deal with all of them adequately, but to treat them separately would be to miss the bigger 
picture. I offer here a general approach to these issues that seeks to save appearances and I 
provide a possibility proof of meaningful empty names. 
 
II. 
Fregeanism. A particularly influential approach to ontology, inspired by Frege (1953), can be 
characterised as the conjunction of two claims (cf. MacBride 2003, p. 108). First, 
 
Syntactic Decisiveness: if an expression exhibits the characteristic syntactic features of 
a singular term, then the expression in question has the semantic function of referring 




Following Hofweber (2016, pp. 24-26), let’s call expressions that exhibit the relevant syntactic 
features, syntactically singular terms, and expressions that have the function of referring to a 
single object, whether or not they carry out that function, semantically singular terms. Syntactic 
Decisiveness claims that all syntactically singular terms are semantically singular terms. 
 
The second Fregean claim is 
 
Referential Minimalism: that a semantically singular term features in a true sentence (of 
a certain sort) ensures that this expression refers to a single object.1 
 
Together these two claims entail that true sentences (of a certain sort)2 containing syntactically 
singular terms are ontologically committing, since they commit us to the objects referred to by 
the syntactically singular terms in these sentences. Relatedly, existential quantification into 
(syntactically) singular term position – nominal quantification – is also ontologically 
committing, since such sentences can be true, only if there is an object that is a witness of the 
quantificational claim. 
 
So, a central task for the Fregean is to determine the true sentences containing syntactically 
singular terms or an existential nominal quantifier. Once we have done this, our first-order 
ontological commitments follow. 
 
 
1 I am using ‘reference’ to pick out a relation between a term and some entities. On the assumption that ‘Pegasus’ 
is an empty name, we cannot refer to Pegasus. Nevertheless, there are myths about Pegasus, and I can think about 
Pegasus, or so it seems. Here I follow Crane (2013, pp.8-10); see also Hofweber (2016, p.104) and Sainsbury 
(2018, §1.5). 
2 I shall ignore this qualification for the time being and consider Referential Minimalism as an unrestricted claim 




Hofweber. Hofweber (2016) offers an interesting variant of Fregeanism, arguing that not all 
syntactically singular terms are semantically singular terms. Hofweber thus departs from 
Fregeanism by rejecting Syntactic Decisiveness.3 For example, Hofweber argues that the best 
explanation of the fact that ‘four’ can occur both as a determiner and in singular term position 
is that even in singular term position, ‘four’ functions as a (displaced) determiner rather than 
as a referring term. 
 
Furthermore, just as Hofweber distinguishes between two sorts of syntactically singular term, 
he also distinguishes between two readings of nominal quantifiers 
 
External quantification: nominal quantifiers range over a domain of objects. 
 
Internal quantification: nominal quantifiers generalize into syntactic position and so 
have an inferential role reading. The inferential role of the internal existential and 
universal quantifiers are given by (i) t is F implies something is F and (ii) everything is 
F implies t is F.4 
 
If Hofweber is right about number words, then generalizations about numbers, e.g. 
 
1. Some numbers are larger than ten, 
 
 
3 Hofweber himself doesn’t compare his approach with Fregeanism, but he rejects Syntactic Decisiveness on an 
intuitive understanding of it. See n8. 
4 Care needs to be taken when specifying which expressions can feature as ‘t’ in ‘t is F’. See Forbes (2006, pp.152-
153), Hofweber (2016, p.74), and Sainsbury (2018, §2.4). 
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cannot be accounted for in terms of external quantification because none of the objects that 
external quantifiers range over are identical to eleven, twelve, and the rest, since these number 
words are not referring terms. As a result, on Hofweber’s picture we need an internal reading 
of the quantifier to account for (1). 
 
Hofweber (2016: 81) denies that we can make do with only internal quantifiers, since 
 
2. There are some objects that will never be referred to 
 
is not true on an internal reading.5 
 
If Hofweber is correct that there are merely syntactically singular terms and that there is an 
internal reading of nominal quantifiers, then Fregeanism is flawed. Determining which 
sentences containing syntactically singular terms and nominal quantifiers are true, does not 
settle which objects we are committed to. Rather, Hofweber argues that we need to examine 
the semantic function of the singular terms and quantifiers of a discourse to establish which of 
the following is true of it 
 
Externalism: Nominal quantifiers are to be read externally and syntactically singular 
terms are semantically singular. 
  
 
5 An internal account of (2) can be given in terms of arbitrary extensions of our language, so perhaps we don’t 
need an external reading - see Sainsbury (2018, §2.7). Moreover, prima facie evidence against the polysemy of 
quantifier expressions comes from the truth of ‘some things are unnamed whereas others do not exist’, but perhaps 
Hofweber could say that there is a third reading of the quantifier. Hofweber (2016, chapter 3) offers further 
arguments for an external reading, but I can’t consider them here. Even if there is no external reading of the 
quantifiers in ‘ordinary’ English, an external reading may be needed in the metalanguage to specify the truth 
conditions of the internal reading. I proceed below as if we need both internal and external readings. 
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Internalism: Nominal quantifiers are to be read internally and syntactically singular 
terms are not semantically singular. 
 
Externalist discourse is ontologically committing, a la Fregeanism, internalist discourse is not 
so committed contra Fregeanism.6 For Hofweber, then, Fregeanism is an overgeneralization: 
Fregeanism assumes externalism across the board, but by carefully examining the function of 
linguistic expressions, Hofweber argues, we can determine that there are internalist discourses, 
such as our everyday talk about numbers. In order to answer the central ontological question, 
what is there?, in the externalist sense, Hofweber argues we need to establish which discourses 
are externalist (Hofweber 2016, 102, 306).7 
 
I agree with Hofweber that we need to investigate the semantic function of expressions of the 
same syntactic type in order to determine our ontological commitments – Syntactic 
Decisiveness is a substantive empirical matter.8 But here I want to leave to one side the question 
of whether there are merely syntactically singular terms and/or internalist discourses, and 
explore what follows when we focus instead on semantically singular terms and, as we shall 
see, predicates.9 Even given this restriction, however, we can see that Hofweber’s approach to 
ontology is incorrect because it is incomplete. We apparently need an internal reading of the 
 
6 Indeed, Hofweber argues that internalism is committed to the absence of the relevant objects. 
7 As Hofweber (2016, pp.57-58) rightly notes ‘there is’ is not a quantifier, but nevertheless ‘there are Fs’ is an 
existentially quantified statement which, on the external reading of the quantifier, commits us to Fs. See also 
Crane (2013, §2.6). 
8 Hofweber relies on an intuitive notion of syntactically singular termhood. The Fregean could defend Syntactic 
Decisiveness by relying on some other notion of syntactically singular termhood (see Schwartzkopff, 2016 for 
recent discussion). Indeed, the Fregean could take the data that Hofweber (2016, pp.27-28) takes to show ‘the 
number of moons of Jupiter’ is not a paradigmatic description, to thereby show that it is not a syntactically singular 
term. Still, noting this does nothing to diminish Hofweber’s case for claiming that some intuitively singular terms 
are not semantically singular. My focus below will be on proper names which are paradigmatic syntactically 
singular terms. 
9 Or at least focus on terms that Hofweber takes to be semantically singular. It is not clear that fictional names do 
have the function of referring rather than the function of pretend reference instead. 
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nominal quantifier since we generalize from sentences containing empty semantically singular 
terms, as illustrated by 
 
3. Leverrier thought that Vulcan lay between Mercury and the Sun, so there is something 
Leverrier thought lay between Mercury and the Sun, namely Vulcan.10 
 
Of course, there are philosophers who claim that empty names cannot be used in true sentences. 
But such a position seems counterintuitive in the extreme and I’m not aware of any good 
argument for the claim; it does not follow from the rejection of descriptivism or Fregean senses, 
or from the acceptance of object-dependent thought (Sainsbury, 2005a). Just as there can be a 
picture of a dog, even when there is no dog it is a picture of, there can be thoughts about horses, 
even when there is no horse it is a thought about. And what is to stop us characterising this 
thought about a horse as a thought about Pegasus, if the thought has the requisite 
causal/intentional connection to the myth (see §5)? In what follows, I assume that empty names 
can figure in true sentences, as seems to be the case.11 
 
So, even without considering merely syntactically singular terms, we can see that we need an 
internal reading of nominal quantifiers.12 But this shows that Hofweber’s 
Externalism/Internalism distinction is not exhaustive, because in (3) the quantifier is to be read 
internally, whereas ‘Vulcan’ is a semantically singular term, albeit one that fails to refer.13 
 
10 Hofweber (2016, pp. 68-72) claims we need an internal reading because there are empty semantically singular 
terms, but this alone is insufficient. Rather we need examples such as (3). Hofweber (2016, pp.71-72) also uses 
unspecific readings of hyperintensional transitives to motivate the internal quantifier: from ‘I want a sloop, though 
no sloop in particular’, it follows that there is something I want, namely a sloop, though not of course, that there 
is a sloop I want. See also Sainsbury (2018, p.42), and §5 below. 
11 Hofweber himself accepts this, but is reluctant to rest weight on particular examples, although see (2016, pp.98-
99). 
12 Cf. Crane (2013, chapter 2) and Sainsbury (2018, chapter 2). 
13 Could one deny that ‘Vulcan’ in (3) is semantically singular? Perhaps, but names are considered paradigmatic 
singular terms. Moreover, the considerations that Hofweber adduces in favour of merely syntactically singular 
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Moreover, given that some discourses that use empty names also talk about unnamed objects, 
we have discourses that use semantically singular terms and have both internal and external 
readings of the nominal quantifier. For example, whereas (3) requires the quantifier to be read 
internally, (4) requires that it be read externally. 
 
4. Some planets have not been named. 
 
Hofweber (2016, p.107) does consider discourses that are neither internal nor external but 
dismisses them as unstable. Hofweber rightly notes that if our syntactically singular terms are 
not used with the aim of referring, then it would be strange for us to employ quantifiers on their 
external reading, since there would be no objects corresponding to the singular terms for us to 
quantify over. Hofweber, however, does not argue against the other ‘unstable’ option where 
semantically singular terms combine with internal quantifiers. But as we have seen, ordinary 
discourse is mixed in this way: singular terms are used with the aim of referring, but sometimes 
this aim is not fulfilled and so an internal reading of the quantifiers is needed to account for the 
generalizations we make from true sentences containing empty names. 
 
Hofweber might reply as follows. If a speaker intends to refer with ‘N’, then why does she 
employ the internal reading of the quantifier, rather than the external one? It is not incoherent 
to restrict oneself to only the internal reading, but by the speaker’s lights, both the internal and 
the external generalization should follow. So, anyone who restricts themselves to only the 
internal one is making, by their own lights, an unreasonable restriction. This reply, however, 
rests on the speaker believing ‘N’ refers and not merely intending to refer with ‘N’. But is it 
 




not incoherent to intend to refer with ‘N’ and not believe that ‘N’ refers? No, since when I use 
the name ‘Vulcan’ I intend to use it in the way that Leverrier did (cf. Kripke, 1980), which is 
to refer to a planet, but unlike Leverrier, I know that his intention was thwarted. There is 
nothing unstable about this. 
 
Moreover, given the ubiquity of empty singular terms, it is unclear whether any discourses are 
externalist. In order to determine whether a discourse is ontologically committing, it is not 
sufficient to determine whether its singular terms are semantically singular, since some 
discourses are neither internal nor external. As a result, we must also determine whether these 
semantically singular terms successfully refer (and/or which quantifiers are to be read 
externally).14 That is, Referential Minimalism, as an unrestricted claim, appears to be false, 
regardless of whether Syntactic Decisiveness is true. And because of this we should reject that 
either Fregeanism or Hofweber provide fully general answers. Nevertheless, we can agree with 




Property Ascriptions. Given the falsity of unrestricted Referential Minimalism how should we 
determine whether a semantically singular term refers? Is there a linguistic test for whether 
such a term refers? Fregeanism sometimes limits the scope of Referential Minimalism to 
subject-predicate sentences, which given Syntactic Decisiveness yields 
 
 The First-Order Existence Principle (1EP): a is F → ∃x x=a 
 
14 Hofweber (2017, p. 490) agrees that whether a putative empty name such as ‘santa’ is an empty semantically 
singular term depends both on the claim that ‘santa’ is semantically singular and also on the claim that it fails to 




where ‘a is F’ is a sentence formed by combining a name with a verb phrase.15 
 
But why should we accept 1EP and Referential Minimalism even so circumscribed? Classical 
logic would license 1EP, but given truths containing empty names, the external quantifier, (∃x), 
is free, not classical. We can, however, discern two arguments in favour of 1EP in Williamson 
(2013). First, Williamson (2013: 151-152) asks how does a putatively meaningful empty name 
differ in its contribution to the truth conditions of subject-predicate sentences from a 
meaningless empty name? Let us accept that there are meaningless names (or pseudo-names) 
such as the name hereby introduced, ‘Qwerty’. In virtue of what can ‘Pegasus’ feature in true 
(subject-predicate) sentences whereas ‘Qwerty’ cannot? We might add, in virtue of what do 
different meaningful empty names combine with the same predicate to produce different truth-
values, as many of those who reject 1EP claim? Those who reject 1EP owe us a 
hyperintensional semantics for names that allows them to draw the distinctions they make. I’ll 
return to this in the next section. 
 
A second line of argument to be found in Williamson for 1EP starts with the rhetorical question 
‘[h]ow could a thing be propertied were there no such thing to be propertied?’ (2013: 148).16 
But note that this question supports not 1EP, but 
 
Property Ascription 1EP: if ‘a is F’ is a property ascription, then a is F → ∃x a=x. 
 
 
15 1EP and related principles below are formulated in terms of monadic predicates, but more generally the issue 
is whether true sentences with n-place predicates entail that the singular terms in those sentences refer. 
16 Williamson asks this question in a discussion of related principle, but it is illuminating to ask it here. 
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We only get from Property Ascription 1EP to 1EP, if we assume, that true subject-predicate 
sentences ascribe properties to objects. This assumption is true if we accept a Fregean picture 
of predicates 
 
Syntactic Decisiveness*: if an expression exhibits the characteristic syntactic features 
of a predicate, then the expression in question has the semantic function of ascribing a 
property to the object referred to by the singular term it is combined with (when it 
combines with a singular term).17 
 
Let’s call expressions that exhibit the syntactic features of a predicate, syntactic predicates, 
and expressions that have the function of ascribing properties, whether or not they carry out 
that function, semantic predicates. Syntactic Decisiveness* claims that all syntactic predicates 
are semantic predicates. 
 
I will not here provide a criterion of syntactic predicatehood, but I do not assume that all verb 
phrases are syntactic predicates. Following Higgins (1973), linguists usually distinguish 
between different copula clauses. Here are three: predicative, as in ‘Donald is orange’; equative 
as in ‘Donald is Trump’; and specificational as in ‘the thing/what I don’t like about Donald is 
his hair’. We could limit syntactic predicates to predicational copula clauses and non-copula 
clauses however these are delimited (see Mikkelsen, 2011 and Rieppel, 2016: for discussion). 
As Mikkelsen puts it 
 
 
17 Predicates also form sentences when combined with quantified noun phrases, but in such cases they are not 
always ascribing a property to something, even if they are picking out a property. We could distinguish between 
ascription as dyadic relation between a predicate and a property, and ascription to as a triadic relation between a 
predicate, a property and an object. See Rieppel (2016, §5.2) 
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The intuition about predicational [copula] clauses is that they predicate a 
property of the subject referent. In this respect they are like non-copular 
clauses [e.g. Donald cheats] … Intuitively, the other … kinds of copular 
clauses do not involve predication. Equatives, as the name suggests, 
equate the referents of the two expressions flanking the copula. Neither 
is predicated of the other. Specificational clauses involve valuing of a 
variable: the subject expression sets up a variable …and the post-copular 
expression provides the value for that variable. Mikkelsen (2011, 
p.1807).18 
 
Syntactic Decisiveness* bridges the gap between Property Ascription 1EP and a version of 
1EP limited to syntactic predicates and so we have our linguistic test for reference and with it 
a Fregean approach to ontology. Views like Syntactic Decisiveness* are commonplace (e.g. 
see Mikkelsen above and also Rieppel, 2016, p.667), but why should we accept Syntactic 
Decisiveness*? I think this is a key question in helping us determine our first-order ontology, 
and this can be brought out by noting the following inconsistent triad (in what follows 
‘predicate’ means syntactic predicate): 
 
5. Subject-predicate sentences express property ascriptions (Syntactic Decisiveness*). 
6. There are true subject-predicate sentences containing empty names (denial of 1EP). 
7. A property ascription cannot be true, if there is no object ascribed the property 
(Property Ascription 1EP). 
 
 
18 Even focusing only on predicational copula clauses, we have to be careful, since ‘is so called because of his 
size’ is a predicational copula, but ‘someone is so called because of his size’ appears not to make sense. But is not 
the notion of a predicate tied as much to quantification as to combining with singular terms? Of course, if we 
interpret the ‘so called’ in context as meaning, for example, called Giorgione, then the problem disappears. 
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Only someone in the grip of a philosophical theory would deny (6), maintaining 1EP, given 
the truth of singular negative existentials such as 
 
8. Pegasus does not exist. 
 
So 1EP is to be rejected, meaning that either Property Ascription 1EP or Syntactic 
Decisiveness* has to go. 
 
I share Williamson’s puzzlement as to how (7) could be false: very plausibly a property 
ascription is true iff there is a referent of the singular term and this has the property ascribed 
by the predicate, otherwise what is it to truly ascribe a property to an object? Crane (2013, 
§3.4) maintains that property ascriptions can be true even when there is no thing to be 
propertied. This is because Crane thinks that property talk is pleonastic and accepts the 
inference from (i) Vladimir is F to (ii) there is a property Vladimir has, namely F-ness. But the 
inference from (i) to (ii) is prima facie invalid – where does talk of properties appear from? 
What follows from (i) is (iii) There is something Vladimir is. (And we can add, namely F, as 
long as we are careful to interpret F in cases like ‘so-called because of his size’ see n18.).  In 
any case, Williamson and I could instead put the point in terms of describing objects rather 
than ascribing properties. 
 
What has to go, is Syntactic Decisiveness*: true subject-predicate sentences containing empty 
singular terms are not property ascriptions (or true descriptions of objects). (Similarly, true 
sentences containing transitive verbs and empty names are not relation ascriptions, see below). 
This allows us to answer Williamson’s question satisfactorily; a property ascription can’t be 
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true if there is no thing to be propertied, but counterexamples to 1EP are not property 
ascriptions. 
 
If we reject 1EP, as suggested here, do we have a linguistic test for when a singular term refers? 
Negative free logicians, such as Burge and Sainsbury, reject 1EP in full generality, instead 
claiming that simple sentences are ontologically committing. But what is a simple sentence and 
why think such sentences are committing? Sainsbury (2005b, p.67n2) defines a simple sentence 
as “one consisting of a non-complex n-place predicate concatenated with n referring 
expressions” (see also Burge 1974, pp. 312-313).19 The idea, then, is that the predicates in any 
counterexamples to 1EP contain complex predicates.20 
 
But why think simple sentences are ontologically committing? Well, because they are property 
ascriptions: “a true simple predication refers to something and predicates a property which that 
object possesses (the idea extends to any n-ary simple sentence)” (Sainsbury 2005a, p.66), that 
is, a true n-ary simple sentence refers to some things and predicates a relation that holds 
between those things See also Burge (1974: 313). The idea, then, must be that true subject-predicate 
sentences containing empty names are not property ascriptions. 
 
The approach taken here, then, is similar to that of Burge and Sainsbury, but I dispense with 
the notion of a simple sentence. First, if simple sentences are ontologically committing in virtue 
 
19 Evans (1982, p.49) formulates a similar claim in terms of atomic sentences, but Evans’ formulation rules out 
sentences containing complex referring terms, but these may be ontologically committing too, and Sainsbury 
wants to capture this. As we shall see, I want to allow for (some) complex predicates too. 
20 Elsewhere, (Sainsbury 2005a, p.66n9) simple sentences are not restricted to sentences containing non-complex 
predicates. On this reading, Sainsbury’s claim is prima facie equivalent to 1EP and hence false. However, 
Sainsbury himself accepts that there are counterexamples to 1EP, so must think that the relevant VPs are not 
predicates. Indeed, Sainsbury (2005a, p.69) claims that ‘is not identical to’ is not a predicate. I think Sainsbury 
has in mind the notion of a predicate at the level of logical form rather than surface grammatical form (see §5 
below). Presumably, then, Sainsbury thinks non-complex predicates are logical predicates, and so his 2005a and 
2005b views are equivalent. 
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of being property ascriptions, we can simply frame the discussion directly in terms of property 
ascriptions. The notion of a simple sentence is explanatorily redundant. Things would be 
different, if simple sentences corresponded to surface grammatical forms, but they do not.21 As 
Crane puts it 
 
The mere idea of a sentence free of truth-functional operators, and of 
‘intensional’ operators ... is clear enough, but … these restrictions do not on 
their own determine a kind of expression which always determines a 
falsehood when combined with a non-referring term. There does not seem to 
be a syntactic or formal criterion of simplicity (2013, p.55). 
 
To see this, consider sentences containing hyperintensional transitive verbs and empty names: 
 
9. Leverrier is thinking about Vulcan. 
 
On an intuitive notion of simplicity, (9) is a two-place simple sentence containing an empty 
name and so should be false by Sainsbury’s (2005a) lights, but it seems as though it could be 
true.22 Moreover, there appear to be even one-place grammatically simple sentences containing 
empty names that are true: Crane (2013, p.55) offers ‘Pegasus is mythical’ and ‘Holmes is 
fictional’ to which we might add ‘Vulcan is contemplated/thought about’. 
 
 
21 Burge and Sainsbury in effect concede this: we should “count an expression an atomic predicate in natural 
language only if one is prepared to count simple singular sentences containing it untrue whenever they also contain 
non-denoting singular term” (Burge, 1974, p.313); and  “what is to count as a simple sentence is to be moulded 
by the theory” (Sainsbury, 2005a, p.69), see also n20. 
22 Sainsbury’s (2018) view allows for the truth of (9). 
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Second, there are subject-predicate sentences containing complex predicates that are 
ontologically committing, since they are property ascriptions: 
 
10. Eliud is extremely fast. 
11. Eliud is slim and fast. 
 
Better, then, to jettison the notion of a simple sentence and theorise instead in terms of property 
ascriptions directly. 
 
Pulling apart subject-predicate sentences from property ascriptions allows us to give an 
illuminating gloss of the free logician’s distinction between existence-entailing predicates and 
predicates that are not existence-entailing; existence-entailing predicates have as their function 
the ascription of properties, whereas predicates that do not entail existence do not have this 
function. This, then, raises the question of what do predicates that are not existence-entailing 
do, if they do not ascribe properties? As well as answering this question, those who reject 1EP 
face Williamson’s challenge to provide a hyperintensional semantics for empty names. As we 
shall see, these two issues are interrelated.23 
 
V. 
The Varieties of Predication. Property Ascription 1EP rules out true property ascriptions 
involving empty names. This is the truth in negative free logic. But there appear to be true 
subject-predicate sentences containing empty names, so, what are the predicates doing in such 
sentences, if not ascribing properties? There is no reason to expect a uniform answer to this 
 
23 I am sympathetic to a lot of Crane’s (2013). But as I argue (Walters, 2015), Crane’s metaphysical reduction of 
truths about the non-existent leaves untouched these residual semantic challenges. 
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question. If some predicates ascribe properties and others do not, there may well be further 
divisions among the predicates that do not ascribe properties. Indeed, that is what I shall suggest 
is the case. 
 
There are at least two sorts of existence-entailing predicate. First, there are predicates that 
succeed in ascribing properties, such as ‘is red’ and ‘runs’. Second, there are predicates that 
have the semantic function of ascribing properties, but which fail to do so, because there is no 
property in question.24 Such predicates are akin to empty names, and plausible examples 
include ‘is a unicorn’, and ‘is a Hobbit’.25 Of course, there are no unicorns or Hobbits, and so 
there are no true subject-predicate sentences of the form ‘n is a unicorn’ and so the 
corresponding instance of 1EP is vacuously true.26 
 
The more interesting case is that of predicates that do not entail existence. On the view 
advocated here, there are at least three sorts of subject-predicate truth containing empty names: 
singular negative existentials, notional readings of hyperintensional transitives, and monadic 
claims that characterise a representation.27 Let us take these in turn. 
 
 
24 I am not endorsing an Aristotelian view of properties, since properties can be tethered to the concrete world in 
ways other than by being instantiated - see (Stalnaker 2012, p.133 n3) and Walters (2013, pp.476-477) for 
discussion. Rather, ‘is a unicorn’ fails to ascribe a property is motivated by claim that in the absence of unicorns, 
there is no condition something would have to meet to be a unicorn: no qualitative condition is sufficient and there 
is no relevant non-qualitative condition (cf. Kripke 1980, p.24). An alternative would be to say that predicates 
such as ‘is a unicorn’ picks out a vacuous property, a property true of nothing. I prefer the Kripkean picture. 
25 Perhaps the function of ‘is a Hobbit’ is not to ascribe a property, but to pretend to ascribe one. 
26 Are there predicates that are existence-entailing, but which do not function to ascribe properties? Perhaps ‘Eliud 
is known to be fast’ is making a knowledge claim about a property ascription, rather than ascribing a complex 
property. 
27 Cf. Crane (2013, §1.4). To these Crane (2013, p.165) adds identity claims of the form a=a, but his reason for 
doing so is not convincing (see Walters 2015, p.234). Hofweber (2016, pp.98-99) allows some identity claims of 
the form a=b to be true when both terms are empty, and his semantics for the internal quantifier turns on this, but 
not essentially so. We can account both for our intuitions of sameness and the semantics of the internal quantifier 




What role does ‘does not exist’ play, if not to ascribe the property of nonexistence to an object? 
Negative free logicians, such as Burge (1974) and Sainsbury (2005a, §6.1), suggest that rather 
than ascribing a property of nonexistence ‘does not exist’ denies the ascription of the property 
of existence.28 So, at the level of logical form 
 
12. Holmes does not exist 
 
is treated as (13) rather than (14), with ‘not’ taking wide scope 
 
13. Not [λx.x exists (Holmes)] 
14. λx.x not exists (Holmes). 
 
This treatment vindicates the thought attributed to Sainsbury (n20) that some grammatical 
predicates are not predicates at the level of logical form. 
 
A second type of true predication involving empty names contain hyperintensional transitive 
verbs such as 
 
15. Leverrier is thinking about Vulcan 
16. Oedipus seeks Jocasta 
17. Corin admires Hera. 
  
 
28 See also Crane (2013, p.74). What about sentences such as ‘Holmes is not detective’? If this sentence is true, 
then this too is a denial of a property ascription. If it is false, then it may be a property ascription. 
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Those who take (15)-(17) to be true sentences containing empty names, have to deny that these 
sentences ascribe relations between the subject and object of the verb; verbs in such sentences 
have a notional rather than relational reading This is independently plausible, since some such 
verbs allow for unspecific readings - I may be seeking a policeman over 8ft without there being 
a particular policeman that I am seeking, indeed without there being any policemen over 8ft at 
all, and so have to be read notionally. Similarly, ‘that is a picture of a dog’ can be true even 
when there is no dog it is a picture of. Goodman (1976) distinguishes between pictures of dogs, 
pictures that stand in the requisite intentional-causal relationship to a particular dog, and dog-
pictures, pictures that are classified a certain way. Building on this proposal, Forbes (2006) 
analyses the notional readings of hyperintensional transitive verbs as characterizing some 
entity, usually an event or a state, but it could be a painting or other representation. For instance, 
(15) is given the following semantics 
 
18. There is an event, e, such that e is a thinking, Leverrier is the agent of e, and e is 
characterised by [[Vulcan]]. 
 
Forbes himself appears to think that there are no meaningful empty names, and instead appeals 
to an ontology of abstract fictional and mythical objects. Such an ontology is not implausible, 
and indeed I endorse it. But what semantic work such an ontology does is a further question. 
That Matt Groening drew a picture of an abstract object when he first drew Homer Simpson 
seems incredible. Rather, Groening drew a picture that was not relationally of anything and 
thereby created a fictional character.29 In any case, an account like Forbes’s can accommodate 
empty names if we assign them appropriate semantic values. Of course, such semantic values 
will have to be hyperintensional in the sense that a Homer-picture need not be a Holmes-
 
29 See my (MS) for the view I have in mind. 
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picture, even though neither Homer nor Holmes exist (as a matter of necessarily). In order to 
account for failures of substitution more generally, Forbes appeals to modes of presentation or 
guises, and these can be co-opted by those who think there are true dyadic predications 
containing empty names, such as (15)-(17), to account for the hyperintensionality of 
characterization.30 
 
It is not clear, however, how to extend the above treatment to monadic representation-
dependent truths such as 
 
19. Holmes is a fictional detective. 
20. Holmes is fictional. 
 
since there is no obvious entity to be characterized. 
 
The semantics of ‘fictional’ is complicated since the term plausibly has many meanings. For 
instance, it seems that there is a reading of ‘fictional’ as in (19), that allows for real things to 
be fictional Fs – 221b Baker Street is the fictional abode of Holmes – and so marks the contrast 
between what is really true and what is fictionally true. This might encourage us to believe that 
(19) can be treated as making a comment on a property ascription, namely that it is fictional 
that Holmes is a detective. I think this approach is implausible, but establishing this would take 
 
30 One might worry that it “is really not clear how there can be a mode of presentation associated with a term 
when there is no object to be presented. … it certainly does not appear that there can be a way of thinking about 
something unless there is something to be thought about in that way” Evans (1982, p.22). But it looks like Evans 
is simply wrong about this – we can think about Vulcan even though, externally speaking, there is no Vulcan. If 




us too far afield, so I will concentrate on (20) instead, but the approach below can be extended 
to treat (19) as well.31 
 
An account of (20) cannot be given by appealing to a sentential operator, for what sentence 
would it operate on? ‘fictional’ in (20) does not mark the contrast between what is really true 
and what is fictionally true, rather it marks the distinction between the nonexistent entities of 
fiction on the one hand, and existents and other nonexistents on the other. We can see this, 
since although Napoleon appears in War and Peace, he is not fictional. Relatedly,  
 
21. Some of the characters in War and Peace are real, but most are fictional. 
 
requires the fictional nonexistent/other reading not the fictionally true/really true reading. 
 
Further, the use of ‘fictional’ to mark the fictional/really distinction is a plain nonsubsective 
adjective in the sense that a fictional F may or may not be an F – Holmes is not (really) a 
detective, but Napoleon is (really) an Emperor. But such adjectives need to be supplemented 
with a noun phrase and cannot stand alone as in (20). That is, it makes no sense to say that Lee 
is potential, alleged, arguable, likely, predicted, putative, or disputed, even though Lee could 
be a potential, alleged, arguable, likely, predicted, putative, or disputed winner.32 
 
So, if ‘is fictional’ in (20) isn’t ascribing a property to its subject or being used to say something 
about a property ascription, what is it doing when it marks the fictional nonexistent/other 
 
31 My discussion here is indebted to Everett’s (2013, §3.4) illuminating discussion of ‘fictional’, albeit one 
couched in a fictionalist framework that I reject. 
32 There are putative counterexamples to this claim, but they all invoke a shift in meaning. For example, I can be 
a believed winner and I can be believed, but what is believed in the former case is something about me, whereas 
what is believed in the latter case is me (and the things I say). 
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distinction? I propose that ‘is fictional’ is used to characterise the use of a name or other term 
that can be used to refer. In particular, I propose the following truth conditions: 
 
22. N is fictional iff (i) N does not exist, and either (ii) ‘N’ was introduced in fictionalising 
and ‘N’ does not co-identify with any term introduced outside of a fiction, prior to ‘N’’s 
introduction or ‘N’ co-identifies with a term, ‘T’, previously introduced in fictionalising 
where ‘T’ does not co-identify with any term introduced outside of a fiction, prior to 
‘T’’s introduction, 
 
where co-identification is the relation that co-referring names and some pairs of empty names 
such as ‘Holmes’ and 'Sherlock', stand in. 
 
Let me elaborate on (22). Either (i) or (ii) is sufficient to get the result that Napoleon is not 
fictional, since Napoleon does exist and this use of ‘Napoleon’ was not introduced in a 
fictionalising context.33 We need both conditions, however, since (ii) alone does not rule out 
previously unnamed objects counting as fictional, and (i) alone is not sufficient as without (ii) 
Vulcan would be fictional. Also, including (i) has the welcome consequence that if N is 
fictional, N does not exist. The complexity of (ii) is accounted for by the following two cases. 
First, suppose I write a novel concerning Vulcan, but that I use the name 'Hephaestus' instead 
of 'Vulcan'. Should we say that Hephaestus is a fictional character. My inclination is to say 
not.34 If that’s right, then introducing a non-referring name, ‘N’, in a fiction is not sufficient for 
N to be fictional – ‘N’ must not co-identify with any earlier empty but non-fictional term. The 
 
33 I am here avoiding the individuation of names and simply assuming that the uses of ‘Napoleon’ to refer to 
Bonapart are different from the uses of ‘Napoleon’ employed by Orwell in Animal Farm, regardless of whether 
these are the same name. 
34 What about Marvel’s Thor, is he not a fictional superhero? According to Wikipedia, Marvel’s Thor is based on 
the mythological figure. 
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need for (iii) is given by the opposite sort of case, where we introduce a new term for a fictional 
nonexistent outside of a fictionalising context, as perhaps with ‘Frankenstein’s Monster’.35 I 
think (22) is correct for the reasons given, but something like (22) must be right, and so we can 
amend (22) accordingly, if you disagree with my judgements on particular cases. Similar, 
treatments can be given for ‘is mythical’ and ‘is imaginary’. 
 
To show that (22) is semantically adequate, and to start to address the challenges left at the end 
of §5, I provide a toy compositional semantics for a fragment of English. This rests on two 
ideas. First, Rami (2020) shows that there is a semantics for empty names that is adequate up 
to intensional contexts that identifies the semantic value of a name with the singleton of its 
referent, if it has one, and otherwise with the empty set.36 That is, [[N]] = {N}. This is not to 
say that ‘N’ refers to {N}; it does not. ‘N’ refers to N, if N exists, and otherwise does not refer 
to anything. Rather, we depart from Frege’s identification of the semantic value of a name with 
its referent.37 
 
In order to account for hyperintensional contexts such as (20) we need to enrich this picture. 
So, second, I suggest that we associate a name not with a single semantic value, but with (for 
our purposes) two semantic values, so that [[N]] are {N}, and {‘N’}.38 (This second semantic 
value allows, but does not force, us to say that ‘N’ refers to itself.) More generally, all 
expressions will be associated with two semantic values, one of which will be the singleton of 
itself.39 This claim is not ad hoc. 
 
35 Whether this is a case of the required sort depends on what counts as a fictionalising context. But clearly cases 
of the sort I have in mind are possible, for example, when someone introduces a new name for a fictional character 
when they mistakenly took the fiction for fact. 
36 For ease of presentation, I’ll ignore issues of modality below. 
37 See Evans (1982, §1.7) on departing from Frege and [[N]]={N}. See also Hofweber (2016, §5.3 and §8.3) on 
distinguishing between semantic value and referent. 
38 Why {‘N’} and not ‘N’? Because ‘Holmes has six letters’ is false rather than uninterpretable. 




First, quotation is a systematic productive device that allows us to move from any linguistic 
item to its quotation and from any quotation, to the material quoted. This is because the relation 
between a quotation and the material quoted is more intimate than between a non-quote name 
and its referent. In our framework, this is reflected by the fact that (i) every linguistic item has 
itself as part of one of its semantic values and (ii) quotation marks signal that the relevant 
semantic value is {‘N’} rather than {N}. 
 
Second, quoted words can be simultaneously used and mentioned in mixed quotation as in 
 
23. Quine said that quotation ‘is weird’. 
 
As (23) attributes the use of a certain phrase to Quine, the quoted words are mentioned. But 
the words are also being used as a predicate rather than a noun phrase to complete the sentence. 
A simple explanation of this fact is that ‘is weird’ has two semantic values, one that accounts 
for its use, the other accounting for its mention. 
 
Third, even when a term is only being used, it still provides access to itself as in ‘Giorgione 
was so called because of his size’; a simple explanation of this is that one of ‘Giorgione’’s 
semantic values determines ‘Giorgione’.40 
 
 
40 See Saka (1998) for discussion of these issues and for account of quotation that is amenable to the view here. 
On Saka’s view a word has a host of entities associated with it, including word tokens, word types, extensions, 
intensions, and, we could add, modes of (re)presentation. Could linguistic entities be used as modes of 
(re)presentation? Perhaps not, if modes of (re)presentation are to be used in thought as well as the semantics of 
natural languages. Paderewski cases cast doubt on whether names can replace modes of (re)presentation, even 
limited to natural language semantics. 
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The semantic values of predicates are functions from sets to truth-values, and the singleton of 
the predicate itself. So, for our fragment, where x is a variable that takes {N} as its value, y a 
variable that takes {‘N’} as its value, and ‘+’ is string concatenation, we have 
 




25. [[exists]] are 
(a) λx. there is an element of x 
(b) {‘exists’} 
 
26. [[is fictional]] are 
(a) λx.y (i) there is no element of x, and the element of y meets (22) (ii) above. 
(b) {‘is fictional’} 
 
From the above, we have a compositional account of the truth of ‘Holmes is fictional’ and the 
falsity of ‘Holmes exists’.  
 
Such an approach allows us to start to answer both of the challenges at the end of §5 for those 
who reject 1EP. First, we have started to address Williamson’s challenge to provide a semantics 
for (necessarily) empty names that allows for failure of substitutivity of empty names. 
Meaningful empty names, but not names like ‘Qwerty’, have as one of their semantic values 
the empty set, so when ‘Qwerty’ is used to combine with ‘exists’ the result is undefined rather 
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than false. Nevertheless, ‘Qwerty’ does have a semantic value since ‘Qwerty’ has six letters.41 
Moreover, all empty names have as one of their semantic values the singleton of themselves, 
and since different empty names are introduced in different contexts, this allows for different 
empty names to combine with the same predicate (e.g. ‘is fictional’) to produce different truth-
values. Second, we have said what it is that predicates that do not ascribe properties do, 
although the answer is not uniform.42 
 
The above is a sketch of the picture of predication that I recommend. Such a picture is not 
forced on us. For one thing, it depends on claims about which sentences are (really) true and 
which terms are empty. For all three types of putative truth containing empty names discussed 
above, philosophers have denied that the singular terms in question are empty or that the claims 
are really true. Such manoeuvres are theoretically driven and strike me as desperate, but as 
highlighted, there are challenges for those who maintain that such claims are true and contain 
empty names, challenges that have only begun to be addressed. A package of views on these 
matters needs to be assessed in the round and it is only by considering particular semantic 
proposals in detail that we can determine whether they are correct, which sentences are true, 




41 Does not Williamson’s worry reappear at the metasemantic level: in virtue of what does ‘Holmes’ but not 
‘Qwerty’ have {} as a semantic value? Yes, but an answer can be given in terms of how ‘Holmes’ was introduced 
and the uses to which it was put. 
42 There are other candidate subject-predicate truths containing empty names that the above discussion does not 
directly treat. But those who deny 1EP disagree over which truths containing empty names there are. My own 
view of fictional names is that they have a use on which they are empty and a use on which they refer, so I can 
account for sentences such as ‘Conan Doyle created Holmes’ by appeal to the referring use (see my (MS) for more 
details). Another sort of case is presented by ‘Vulcan was thought by Leverrier to lie between Mercury and the 




Second-Order Ontology. The above discussion focussed on first-order order ontology – what 
objects are there, externally speaking? But there is a related question in second-order ontology, 
what properties are there, again externally speaking?43 As I noted, there is a Fregean picture of 
predicates as well as names. Above, we focused on 
 
Syntactic Decisiveness*: if an expression exhibits the characteristic syntactic features 
of a predicate, then the expression in question has the semantic function of ascribing a 
property to the object referred to by the singular term it is combined with (when it 
combines with a singular term). 
 
The other part of the package is 
 
Ascription Minimalism: that an ascribing expression features in a true sentence (of a 
certain sort) ensures that the ascribing expression ascribes a property to its subject. 
 
So, for the Fregean, second-order ontology, just like first-order ontology, consists in identifying 
which sentences (of a certain sort) are true. But just as 
 
27. Lee thinks that Pegasus is a unicorn 
 
 
43 Some philosophers think that questions of second-order ontology just are questions of first-order ontology, since 
properties are objects. Others, inspired by Frege (1892), take objects and properties to be nonoverlapping 
ontological categories. I take no stand on the issue here, but because of the existence of debate, and the variety of 
syntactic positions we can quantify into, I treat the questions separately. For recent discussions of these issues see 
Williamson (2013) and Rieppel (2016). 
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show that unrestricted Referential Minimalism is false, it also shows that Ascription 
Minimalism is false since ‘is a unicorn’ does not succeed in ascribing a property. If this is right, 
then we need to admit an internal reading of the second-order quantifier to account for 
 
28. There is something that Lee thinks Pegasus is, namely a unicorn. 
 
In order to decide whether a second-order discourse is ontologically committing, then, we need 
to determine which predicates ascribe properties. If we limit Ascription Minimalism to subject-
predicate sentences, we get 
 
 The Second-Order Existence Principle (2EP): ‘a is F’ → ∃Y Y≈F 
 
where ≈ is the second-order analogue of identity. 
 
That unrestricted Ascription Minimalism is false does not show that 2EP is false, since there 
are no true sentences of the form ‘a is a unicorn’, but that does not give us reason to endorse 
2EP. 2EP is a theorem of classical second-order logic, but given the presence of empty 
predicates, such as ‘is a unicorn’ and ‘is fictional’ the logic of the second-order external 
quantifier is free. Just as with 1EP, we might motivate 2EP by appeal to a rhetorical question 
– how could a thing be propertied were there no such property for the thing to exemplify? But 
what this question supports in the first instance is not 2EP, but rather 
 




We only get from Property Ascription 2EP to 2EP, if we assume, that true subject-predicate 
sentences ascribe properties to objects. Now this is what Ascription Minimalism claims, but I 
have argued against this in the previous two sections. For example, if I am correct that Holmes 
is fictional, then ‘there is something Holmes is, namely fictional’, provides a counterexample 
to 2EP. So, as in the first-order case, in the second-order case we need to determine which 
property ascriptions are true, and this requires us to ascertain which predicates have the 
function of ascribing properties. 
 
2EP and Property Ascription 2EP focus on the case where syntactic (first-order) predicates 
combine with singular terms, but such predicates can also combine with quantified noun 
phrases. This might lead us to reflect on 
 




Higher-Order Property Ascription 2EP: if ‘QNP is F’ is a (higher-order) property 
ascription, then QNP is F → ∃Y Y≈F. 
 
. where ‘QNP’ stands for a quantified noun phrase. 
 
If we want to hold on to Higher-Order Property Ascription 2EP, as we might following a 





29. Nothing is a Hobbit 
 
would need to be not treated as higher-order property ascriptions, But just as the (first-order) 
negative free logician treats singular negative existentials as denials of property ascriptions, we 
can treat (29) not as claiming a first-order property has the property of being uninstantiated, 
but rather as the denial of the higher-order property ascription that the property of being a 
Hobbit is instantiated. 
 
As I noted above, though, we can characterise existence-entailing predicates in terms of 
describing objects rather than property ascriptions, and so we need not, absent further 
argument, conceive of any quantification into predicate position as ontologically committing. 
Perhaps there are good arguments for thinking that not all predicative quantification can be 
conceived of internally, but even so there is no quick route from Property Ascription 2EP, let 
alone 2EP, to second-order ontological commitments.44 
 
VII. 
Conclusion. Both the Fregean and Hofweber think we can settle ontological questions by 
examining language. I am sympathetic to this approach, but I have suggested here that neither 
approach can be embraced even leaving to one side merely syntactically singular terms, and 
even when we focus on subject-predicate sentences and generalizations from them. The truth 
that both approaches approximate is that there cannot be a true ascription of being F to a, in 
the absence of being F or a. But it is doubtful that which sentences ascribe properties can be 
read-off from surface syntax: that a sentence has subject-predicate form does not settle the 
 
44 For instance, one might take inexpressibility considerations to require external quantification over properties 
(see Williamson, 2013 and Hofweber, 2016 chapter 9 for discussion). The point here is that accepting that some 




issue, since syntactic predicates don’t form a uniform semantic class. To decide whether a true 
sentence is a property ascription requires, in part, reflecting on whether the singular terms in 
that sentence refer, and on what story we can tell about the role of the predicates in that 
sentence.  
 
We start with judgments about the truth of some sentences.45 Then we might have reason to 
think some such sentences contain empty terms because of (i) hyperintensionality, (ii) negative 
existentials, (iii) there was no intention to refer (fiction), or (iv) there was plausibly no object 
to be referred to (Vulcan). If the terms are really empty, then we need to both supply an 
adequate hyperintensional semantics for such terms and an account of the role that predicates 
play in such sentences. It is only by considering semantic proposals in detail that we can 
determine whether they are correct, which sentences are true, and which terms refer. There is, 
then, no quick route from linguistic form to ontological commitment.46 
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45 This is not Hofweber’s starting point. Rather, Hofweber thinks that ontological questions that do not concern 
linguistic entities can be answered simply by reflecting on our own language independently of the judgements 
about the truth of certain sentences. But even if this is correct for merely syntactically singular terms, if there are 
any, I have argued it is not correct for semantically singular terms. 
46 I presented distant ancestors of this paper in Aarhus and Hamburg, and a more up-to-date version to online 
audiences of the Bochum workshop on empty names and the Aristotelian Society. My thanks to the audiences on 
those occasions and in particular to Karl Egerton, Manuel García-Carpintero, Thomas Kroedel, Eliot Michaelson, 
Dolf Rami, Roope Ryymin, and Arthur Schipper. For comments on a written version of the paper, special thanks 





Burge, T. 1974: Truth and Singular Terms. Nôus 8: 309–25. 
 
Crane, T. 2013: The Objects of Thought. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
 
Evans, G. 1982: The Varieties of Reference. Oxford: Clarendon Press. 
 
Everett, A. 2013: The Nonexistent. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
 
Forbes, G. 2006: Attitude Problems. Oxford: Clarendon Press. 
 
Frege, G. 1892: On Concept and Object. Vietreljahrsschrift fur Wissenschaftliche 
Philosophie 16: 192–205. 
 
Frege, G. 1953: The Foundations of Arithmetic. Translated by J.L. Austin. Oxford: Blackwell. 
 
Goodman, N. 1976: Languages of Art. Indiana: Hackett Publishing Company Inc. 
 
Higgins, F. 1973: The Pseudo-Cleft Construction in English. MIT dissertation. 
http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/12988. 
 
Hofweber, T. 2016: Ontology and the Ambitions of Metaphysics. Oxford: Oxford University 
Press. 
 
Hofweber, T. 2017: Replies to Bennett, Rayo, and Sattig. Philosophy and Phenomenological 




Kripke, S. 1980: Naming & Necessity. Oxford: Blackwell. 
 
MacBride, F. 2003: Speaking with Shadows: A study of Neo-Logicism. British Journal for the 
Philosophy of Science 54: 103-163. 
 
Mikkelsen, L. 2011: ‘Copular Clauses’. In von Heusinger, K., Maienborn, C., and Portner P. 
(eds.) 2011: Semantics: An International Handbook of Natural Language Meaning, vol. 2. 
Berlin: De Gruyter Mouton., pp. 1805–29. 
 
Quine, W.V.O. 1948: On What There Is. Review of Metaphysics 2: 21-38. 
 
Rami, D. 2020: Single-domain free logic and the problem of compositionality. Synthese. 
https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-020-02651-x 
 
Rieppel, M. 2016: Being Something: Properties and Predicative Quantification. Mind 125: 643-
689. 
 
Sainsbury, R.M. 2005a: Reference without Referents. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
 
Sainsbury, R.M. 2005b: Names in Free Logical Truth Theory. In Jose Luis Bermudez ed. 
2005: Thought, Reference and Experience: Themes From the Philosophy of Gareth Evans. 
Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 66–83. 
 




Saka, P. 1998: Quotation and the Use-Mention Distinction. Mind 107: 113-135. 
 
Salis, F. 2013: Fictional Names and the Problem of Intersubjective Identification. dialectica 
67: 283-301. 
 
Schwartzkopff, R. 2016: Singular Terms Revisited. Synthese 193: 909-936. 
 
Stalnaker, R. 2012: Mere Possibilities. Princeton: Princeton University Press. 
 
Walters, L. 2013: Repeatable Artworks as Created Types. British Journal of Aesthetics 53: 
461-477. 
 
Walters, L. 2015: The Problem of Nonexistence: Truthmaking or Semantics? Critical Notice 
of The Objects of Thought, by Tim Crane (Oxford: OUP, 2013). Disputatio VII: 231-245. 
 
Walters, L. MS: Fictional Names. 
 
Williamson, T. 2013: Modal Logic as Metaphysics. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
